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A few decades ago a dominant view in the 
developing world was that growth problems in 
developing countries could be best understood in 
terms of the international environment. Today, no 
one seriously questions the influence of external 
conditions on growth. But most economists would 
also emphasize structural conditions within 
developing countries as key determinants of the 
large differences in the rates of per capita income 
growth among such countries. An examination of 
the economywide policy reforms that took place in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) during the 
1980s and 1990s is particularly relevant to an 
understanding of these determinants. Though it is 
beyond the scope of this brief to discuss economic 
growth theories and assess the successes and 
failures of the economic reforms in the region, the 
discussion will focus on some of the significant 
linkages between growth, policy, and poverty.  
Overview of Latin American Economic Policy 
Reforms since the 1980s 
Economic regimes in Latin America started to 
change during the1980s. The results of previous 
import-substitution strategies bred disillusionment 
and a general acceptance of theoretical 
developments regarding the causes of inflation 
and macroeconomic disequilibrium. In most 
countries in the region, a macroeconomic 
framework designed for open economies began to 
replace the prevailing closed-economy approach. 
Governments introduced economywide reforms 
emphasizing macroeconomic stabilization, 
deregulation, unilateral trade liberalization, and 
privatization. Economists generally concur that the 
impetus for the reforms arose from concerns 
regarding economic strategies affecting all 
sectors, not any one sector in particular. 
Nonetheless, in several countries, certain import-
competing subsectors did retain special status in 
economic policymaking. 
Several countries introduced reforms amid 
major macroeconomic disequilibrium characterized 
by high inflation and unsustainable fiscal and 
current account deficits. In many cases, the 
options for macroeconomic reform were quite 
limited; for decades, several LAC countries 
suffered from high rates of inflation and recurrent 
external crises (balance of payments problems, 
foreign debt crises). Such macroeconomic 
instability substantially reduced growth rates and 
worsened income distribution. The poor, who 
lacked the wherewithal to shield the value of their 
assets and also suffered from real wage declines, 
were particularly harmed. The two main causes of 
inflation were large fiscal deficits, frequently 
financed by printing more money, and the 
mistaken notion that economies could buy 
prosperity with a little more inflation.  
Beyond dealing with the severe 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, the goal of many 
reformers in the mid-1980s and early 1990s was 
to create a better climate for productivity and 
private investment in all economic sectors, 
including one very important for many of the 
poor—agriculture. For the farm sector, the result 
was to be an enhanced competitiveness of the 
tradable sectors in a new scenario in which 
agriculture was to be substantially more 
integrated with the world economy. 
Of course, the reforms most immediately 
affected the incentives facing producers through 
changes in the prices of tradable goods as the 
result of the liberalization of trade policy. In most 
Latin American countries, the major change in 
trade policy was the partial or total removal of 
most quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports, the elimination of export taxes, and a 
gradual reduction in the levels of import tariffs. 
This created incentives to move resources from 
import-competing goods toward the export-
oriented and nontraded sectors. In most 
countries, importable goods were protected and 
exportable goods were taxed. A central goal of the 
reforms was to reduce the explicit and implicit 
anti-export bias that had existed previously—
especially for agriculture, which had been 
burdened as a producer of wage goods and fiscal 
revenue and as a major employer of unskilled 
labor. 
Perhaps more important for all sectors, but 
especially for agriculture, were the indirect effects 
on exchange rates and interest rates—two key 
prices to which the sector is particularly sensitive. 
By the mid-1990s, the exchange rate was 
recognized as the most important “price” affecting 
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the import-competing and export-oriented 
economy. This was not well understood at the 
time of the reforms, or at least it was not 
anticipated to be a future problem. Academicians 
expected that one result of trade liberalization and 
the reduction of the fiscal deficit would be a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. What they 
did not anticipate was the significant appreciation 
of the currency associated with the opening of the 
capital account, the interest of foreign investors 
attracted to the promise of growing economies, or 
the significant increase in domestic real interest 
rates induced by macroeconomic conditions.  
The depth and impact of the reform process 
within the LAC region has been quite diverse; it 
has also been the subject of various studies. But it 
is important to note the unilateral nature of trade 
liberalization in the region during the late 1980s, 
predating the Uruguay Round agreement of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Many LAC 
countries were members of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
those that were not joined the WTO at the time of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. LAC emerged 
from the Uruguay Round without obligations to 
significantly reform trade policy.  
Reforms—and often the lack of reforms—in 
the service sector also played a critical role in 
determining outcomes. It is important to note that 
deregulation and privatization had a major impact 
on the availability of more reliable and lower cost 
services to the economy as a whole. And these 
reforms in the domestic sector also complemented 
trade-related reforms. Examples include the 
privatization and deregulation of port facilities in 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Chile. Chile also 
initiated reforms in telecommunications and airline 
and shipping transport services that were soon 
adopted by most other countries. These 
apparently ancillary reforms were at the center of 
a new environment for trade-oriented producers 
and investors. 
The Importance of Policy for Stimulating 
Poverty-Reducing Growth  
A large body of recent economic literature focuses 
on the relationships between growth and poverty 
reduction. Dollar and Kraay’s controversial study, 
Growth Is Good for the Poor, documented the 
empirical regularity of the link between growth 
and poverty using panel data from 92 countries 
over four decades and provoked wide debate by 
concluding that, on average, the mean income of 
a country’s poorest quintile rises and falls at the 
same rate as average national income. Moreover, 
the study found that other policy-related factors, 
such as public expenditures on health and 
education, and improvements in labor productivity 
in agriculture had little marginal effect on the 
average income of the poorest.  
The controversies sparked by these findings 
have raised questions regarding the role of 
inequality in determining the importance of 
growth for the poor, and the impact of education 
on poverty. For example, simple pro-growth 
strategies to reduce poverty could raise the 
incomes of the poor, but could more rapidly 
increase the incomes of the nonpoor, thereby 
exacerbating income disparities. Another study 
noted that although overall growth reduces the 
poverty rate, the degree to which the poor share 
in the growth varies widely across countries. It 
found that the ability of the poor to enjoy the 
benefits of growth is particularly sensitive to the 
initial conditions of a country’s economy—
especially to the degree of income inequality.  
Additional research finds that improved 
educational outcomes should be a component of a 
“super pro-poor” strategy to both raise the 
incomes of the poor and lessen income disparities. 
This cross-country growth perspective is highly 
consistent with the literature on household survey 
analyses, where broad consensus holds that 
education is important for raising the incomes of 
poor households. The analyses almost always 
show increasing returns to education, though the 
returns are, of course, influenced by education 
quality, parents’ schooling, and other variables. 
Importantly for the rural poor, the returns to 
education also depend on where and how that 
education is applied. In Latin America, the returns 
to schooling are higher in urban areas than in 
rural areas, and higher for nonfarm activities than 
for farm-related ones.  
Despite the controversies surrounding the 
impact of growth on poverty and the importance 
of other variables such as education, there is no 
question regarding the direction of the impact of 
growth on poverty overall. Even in a scenario with 
high income inequality (which is often the case in 
middle-income countries, of which Latin America 
has many), the average income of households in 
the poorest quintile would still increase, although 
at a lower rate than average national income. 
Where there is lower inequality, the average 
income of the poorest would increase even more. 
Moreover, higher growth rates that lead to higher 
incomes across all households indirectly support 
government revenues, and, in turn, allow for 
higher levels of spending on social programs. 
Hence, economic growth has a complementary 
role in sustaining social policies. 
Research has indicated that policies affect 
average income growth, that average income 
growth affects poverty, and that income 
distribution affects the influence of growth on 
poverty. But it is not clear how policy affects 
income distribution and how income distribution 
affects growth. One difficult question is whether 
or not a conflict exists between policies that affect 
distributional measures and poverty in the short 
term, and policies that foster growth and poverty 
alleviation in the long term. Of course, there may 
be policies that both reduce income disparities 3 
and spur economic growth, such as enabling poor 
households to accumulate assets, improving 
access to education, and undertaking measures 
such as safety nets to sustain households in the 
event of adverse income shocks. Evidence 
strongly indicates that sustained growth continues 
to be a necessary condition for reducing poverty. 
The lesson that emerges from the literature is that 
economic growth can be more pro-poor in some 
circumstances and less in others, and that less 
inequality is better than more. But by itself, 
growth is pro-poor. Several studies have shown 
that the patterns of growth matter because some 
industries depend more on unskilled labor than 
others.  
Policies that are biased against labor-intensive 
sectors work to the detriment of the poor. While 
certain policies do contribute to growth and 
reduce income disparities—such as education—
other policies involve trade-offs. As documented in 
the growth literature generally and in studies on 
Latin America in particular, three broad policy-
related concerns have immediate impacts on 
growth, but not necessarily on income 
distribution: financial deepening, trade 
liberalization, and limitations on the size of 
government. Opening the financial system and the 
economy, reducing government interventions and 
spending (often forced by fiscal deficits), and 
stimulating growth could result in greater 
opportunities for those with more human and 
physical assets. Although the incomes of the poor 
could rise, the incomes of the skilled labor force 
and the returns on capital could rise much faster. 
Before treasuries can enjoy the longer term 
benefits of economic growth, the very fiscal 
constraints that might have spurred reforms—
coupled with institutional weaknesses—limit 
governments’ ability to mitigate inequities via 
subsidies and transfers, and as a result 
exacerbate income inequalities. Eventually, 
however, governments can afford to focus on 
equity concerns and public goods. Then the 
question becomes one of the effectiveness of 
public spending (see Box 1 for an overview of the 
composition of public expenditure in Latin 
America). 
Beyond these broad growth-stimulating 
policies, more specific policies can capitalize on 
synergies and, as a consequence, achieve a 
balance between generally enhancing growth and 
increasing the incomes of poor people. For 
example, investments in infrastructure 
development not only provide a boost to economic 
activity, but also provide poorer households with 
greater access to educational opportunities. 
Conditional cash transfers are another example; 
they directly raise the incomes of the poor and 
improve the health and education of children, 
which has dynamic effects for future income 
generation. A third example is the reduction of  
Box 1—The Composition of Public Expenditures in 
Latin America 
Many studies on rural development present a rich agenda 
for policy initiatives. The question of how to pay for the 
proposed strategies, however, is seldom addressed 
satisfactorily. This raises questions regarding the 
effectiveness of expenditures in producing growth, an 
extremely important factor in the design of strategies for 
development and poverty alleviation. Empirical work by 
Lopez provides a good example of the importance of 
priorities. Lopez finds that while government spending can 
slightly elevate agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) 
per rural person, a mix of spending on public goods and 
private subsidies is much more significant. A reallocation of 
10 percentage points of total rural public expenditures (for 
example, from 40 to 50 percent spending on public goods) 
raises agricultural GDP per rural person by 2.3 percent—
without spending a dime more in total. A dollar added to 
total rural expenditures would be shared by both public 
and private goods. In contrast, an intramarginal shift of a 
dollar from private to public goods is claimed entirely by 
public goods and is lost to private subsidies. This leads to 
more money for public goods and less encouragement for 
rent seeking, less overinvestment in subsidized activities, 
and delays in restructuring away from subsidized 
investments. 
anti-export bias, which was employed to notable 
effect in Chile following economic reforms; the 
result was increased employment demand for the 
unskilled and a significant reduction in poverty.  
Very poor countries, with smaller income 
inequalities and limited fiscal resources, should 
emphasize pro-growth policies. For middle-income 
countries, where income inequality is higher and 
fiscal resources are less constrained, pro-growth 
policies should be complemented with policies aimed 
at reducing inequality. Within middle-income 
countries (most in Latin America) regional disparities 
appear to be increasing, creating a possible trade-off 
between aggregate growth and geographic equity. 
This is a concern because poor people often lack the 
necessary resources to allow them to migrate.  
What Is the Pathway from Poverty to Growth? 
Growth is important for poverty reduction, but 
does poverty impede growth? In a notable 
publication aimed specifically at Latin America, 
Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and 
Vicious Circles, Perry et al. discuss several 
channels through which poverty does in fact 
influence overall economic growth:  
1.  The poor often do not have access to credit 
markets and lack land titles or other means of 
supplying collateral; hence, potential 
investments lie dormant.  
2.  Poverty and illness are related: improving 
health improves productivity. 
3.  The quality of schooling often varies according 
to income. Inferior schooling is bad enough 
for adults in poor households, but they often 
can’t afford to keep their children in school for 
long and, thus, miss out on the higher returns 4 
to education that could accrue in the next 
generation with each year of schooling. Lower 
education levels reduce the earning potential and 
mobility of labor. Education also affects health, 
child mortality, and household size. 
4.  Poor households often lack the financial 
wherewithal to absorb labor-market shocks 
and the human capital that provides labor 
mobility to respond to those shocks. Investing 
in human capital or in a specialized activity, 
like any other investment, is a decision that 
balances expected returns with risks. The 
greater the risk, the higher the returns ought 
to be. Without adequate insurance and credit 
markets, poor households face higher risks of 
investment and so underinvest compared with 
households with more diversified income 
sources or access to funds to tide them over 
shocks. 
5.  Poorer regions and countries simply have 
fewer people ready and able to initiate or take 
advantage of productivity-enhancing 
innovations.  
6.  Furthermore, without infrastructure and 
human capital, poor regions do not attract 
investments from outside. And people living in 
those regions face even greater obstacles to 
seeking opportunities elsewhere. 
7.  Regional income disparities, especially when 
they overlap with disparities related to 
ethnicity or race, can sometimes lead to 
regional political problems and to a 
subsequent increase in the risks associated 
with all types of investments. 
Concluding Comments 
The Latin American economic reform process 
offers valuable lessons. Beginning in the 1980s, 
the reforms were deep and wide, and they were 
introduced during times of major macroeconomic 
crises and hence government spending 
restrictions. Not all expectations for reforms were 
fulfilled, but most countries have indeed 
undergone significant structural change. And 
despite early fluctuations, significant growth is 
occurring in many countries. An unanticipated 
outcome is that the reforms prepared Latin 
American economies for the now ongoing process 
of globalization. 
The critical lesson for reducing poverty is that 
growth must be pro-employment—particularly of 
unskilled labor. In the long run, the main factor 
for both growth and poverty reduction appears to 
be education. The record of educational coverage 
and quality in Latin America is still disappointing 
overall, however—certainly compared to the East 
Asian experience. On the positive side, several 
countries are now emphasizing improved 
education for poor people.  
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